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there is no question that significant changes occurred in canadian 
refugee policy under the conservative government of stephen harper 
during its nearly ten years in power. indeed, observers note that virtu-
ally no aspect was left untouched.2 the effects of many of these altera-
tions are still unfolding, and while the subsequent liberal government 
of Justin trudeau committed itself to reversing or modifying some of 
them, many will likely be preserved.3
in this chapter, we focus on changes that occurred to canada’s 
inland refugee policy, with two larger goals in mind.4 first, we aim to 
demystify the role of the courts in shaping refugee policy in canada. 
the literature often attributes a heightened negative (i.e., overly rights-
expansive) impact to the courts – largely as a result of the 1985 Singh 
decision, the first charter case handed down by the supreme court 
of canada (scc) that dealt with refugee claims5 – without providing 
much empirical evidence6 or focuses on important points of legal inter-
pretation without more fully engaging their policy implications.7 stud-
ies that investigate the role of the courts in this policy area on a more 
empirical basis, in contrast, remain too few.8
second, we seek to contribute to a growing body of work that reflects 
on the contentious relationship between the harper government and 
the courts, which perhaps reached its nadir in the public dispute over 
marc nadon’s failed appointment to the scc.9 such conflict was also 
notably seen in a 2011 speech in which then immigration minister Jason 
Kenney accused federal court of canada (fc) judges of undermining 
the government’s rights-restrictive approach to refugees.10
to shed light on the relationship between the courts and canadian 
inland refugee policy, we open with a review of the rights-restrictive 
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heft and tenor of policy changes – and their surrounding discourse – by 
the harper government between 2006 and 2015. next, we discuss the 
relationship between the courts and public policy, beginning with some 
remarks on the challenges of studying the impact of the former on the 
latter. We suggest that shifting the focus to how and why refugee claim-
ants and their supporters mobilized the law in opposition to the harper 
government’s restrictive agenda is necessary to grasp the nature and 
impact of judicial involvement. this is then illustrated by examin-
ing the mobilization that occurred through and beyond the courts in 
response to the government’s 2012 cuts to the interim federal health 
Program (ifhP) for refugees.
our research shows that while the role of the courts in overseeing 
canadian refugee policy is generally quite limited, significant mobili-
zation on behalf of refugees occurred in response to the harper govern-
ment’s particularly rights-restrictive approach. indeed, notwithstanding 
an inherently unfriendly legal opportunity structure (los), litigation 
and “rights talk” played an important part in the broader political 
advocacy work of refugee organizations (ros), in tandem with other 
strategies such as public awareness campaigns, coalition-building, and 
lobbying for policy change. importantly, there was the 2011 founding of 
the litigation-savvy canadian association of refugee lawyers (carl), 
which – together with the canadian council for refugees (ccr) – took 
a lead legal-mobilization role in the refugee-advocacy community. as 
well, there was involvement by new constituencies, especially within 
the medical profession, which created canadian doctors for refugee 
care (cdrc) in response to the ifhP cuts. to understand the relation-
ship between the courts and policy, then, it is necessary to appreciate 
the broader policy and political contours within which court rulings 
emerge and the specific contexts that prompt court involvement in the 
first instance.
The Restrictionist Turn under Harper, 2006–15
during its time in power, the harper government made it harder for 
asylum seekers to seek and find protection in canada. it did not simply 
adopt a more restrictive approach, however, but also sought to shift 
the canadian refugee status determination (rsd) regime away from a 
rights-based and towards a rights-restrictive and more selective foun-
dation. many “rights-based principles that underlay the pre-existing 
regime [were] replaced by other justifications that pay significantly 
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less attention to the interests and experiences of particular claimants,” 
reflecting a privileging of the belief that “the reason to protect is based 
on an aspect of the public interest rather than an individual right.”11 the 
government thereby increased its discretionary power over refugees 
as an asylum seeker was “reconfigured as primarily a migrant whom 
the government may have reason to select” rather than an individual 
empowered to make rights-based claims against the state.12
as it transformed the rsd regime, the conservatives constrained 
traditional avenues of communication and influence within the refugee 
policy community. although this was in many ways consistent with 
previous trends, the harper government was particularly direct in its 
rejection of groups and individuals who did not share its ideological 
beliefs and practices.13 at the same time, it more tightly circumscribed 
the actions and influence of public servants in favour of policies devel-
oped in the Prime minister’s office.14 in contrast, although refugee 
policy had long been dominated by the bureaucracy, there nonetheless 
had previously been substantial routine interaction (and at times influ-
ence) on the part of ros through such mechanisms as parliamentary 
committees and regular meetings with, and access to, officials.15 as the 
traditional political (and policy) environment was constricted, how-
ever, and as the conservatives consolidated and expanded their rights-
restrictive approach, the impetus for ros to seek extra- parliamentary 
influence in cases such as the ifhP – especially through the judiciary – 
increased.
the harper government expanded and consolidated its rights- 
restrictive approach in both policy discourse and practice with few 
political checks, especially during its final, majority-government man-
date. although the balance between refugee protection and border 
control has long varied over time, canada had – since the creation of 
the immigration and refugee board (irb) in 1989 – adopted a broadly 
rights-based approach to rsd.16 for example, a recent comparative 
study portrays canada’s “cadillac” model as embodying “a com-
mitment to a system of administrative justice based on a centralized, 
resource-rich professional judgment.”17 the conservatives, for their 
part, sought to redirect the cadillac along a more rights-restrictive and 
discretionary road through a range of discursive and policy acts.
this approach was centred on the premise that the canadian regime 
was too generous and encouraged those who did not require protection 
to claim asylum in hopes of obtaining undeserved economic, political, 
and/or social benefits in canada or even to threaten its national security. 
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for example, in introducing legislation in 2010 to increase restrictions 
on access to and fairness within canadian rsd, Kenney argued,
our generosity is too often abused by false asylum claimants who come 
here and do not need our protection. they’re misusing the asylum system 
to jump the immigration queue rather than waiting their turn like every-
one else. … they try to enter the country through the back door and they 
take advantage of our asylum system to avoid waiting in line like every-
one should for their application to be processed.18
this premise and discourse were used consistently and extensively by 
the conservatives to justify a three-pronged, rights-restrictive approach.
first, the government made it more difficult for asylum seekers to 
travel to and enter canada. a prominent practice of such interdiction 
involved imposing visa requirements alongside more rigorous and 
multilayered document and transit inspections. for example, visitor 
visa requirements were imposed to prevent roma and mexican asylum 
seekers from travelling to canada to make refugee claims.19 new data-
sharing arrangements with countries and air carriers were introduced 
to facilitate tracking and excluding potential asylum seekers before, or 
removing them after, arrival.20 the government also reduced the num-
ber of exemptions under the restrictive canada-u.s. safe third coun-
try agreement, and it pursued more vigorous enforcement policies at 
and beyond the canadian border, including helping other states inter-
cept sea vessels carrying asylum seekers.21 these and other measures 
prevented asylum seekers from being able to make rights-based claims 
against the state (insofar as they could not reach canada) and increased 
the state’s discretionary power.
second, the government made it harder for individuals to pursue 
asylum claims in canada after their arrival, both in terms of their access 
to the rsd system and the fairness with which they were treated within 
it. most notably, the balanced refugee reform act and the Protecting 
canada’s immigration system act “increased the difficulties for all 
claimants who [were] attempting to navigate the channels that led to 
the determination of their status, with some being singled out to face 
additional burdens.”22 such changes, among other measures, decreased 
the chances of claimants receiving a fair hearing as new limits were 
placed on processing and appeal timelines, while decision making was 
shifted from independent appointees to public servants. a qualified 
exception involved the creation of the refugee appeal division (rad), 
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which instituted an appeal of a negative determination of a refugee 
claim on its merits; this is discussed in more detail in the next section.
of particular relevance to this chapter is the differentiation created 
among claimants according to their country of origin and method of 
arrival, which negatively affected prospects in rsd and appeal rights, 
for example. the lack of arm’s-length authority in designating coun-
tries as “safe,” as seen under new designated country of origin (dco) 
provisions, meant that political interests and pressures could take 
precedence over an individual’s right to seek and find refuge.23 it is 
worth noting that when these provisions were first introduced by the 
conservative minority government in 2010, a number of limits on min-
isterial discretion were included; these were removed when new legis-
lation was passed in 2012 under a conservative majority. at that time, 
the government also created a designated foreign national (dfn) cat-
egory, targeting “irregular” arrivals of migrants “in groups of two or 
more in a way that prevents the timely examination of their identity 
and admissibility” or that appears to involve human smuggling.24
the third prong made it harder for asylum seekers to remain in 
canada, especially but not only after an initial denial of their claim. 
thus, for those from dcos, removals could be undertaken even if an 
individual applied for judicial review, and greater restrictions were 
placed on their ability to apply for a Pre-removal risk assessment 
(Prra). alongside an increased use of detentions and deportations,25 
the conservatives restricted work permits for those from dcos and 
proposed changes through their 2014 omnibus budget bill to allow 
provinces to deny social assistance to refugee claimants. in addition, 
greater efforts were made to remove protected status (so-called cessa-
tions) from refugees who had “re-availed themselves of the protection 
of their home country,” even those who had received canadian per-
manent resident status.26
given the constrained political environment the harper government 
created, and the rights-restrictive approach it pursued, the courts pro-
vided a logical avenue along which to counter conservative policies 
towards asylum seekers. the history of the los in this area, however, 
suggests that groups would have met with limited courtroom success.
Courts, Mobilization, and Policy Outcomes
although courts are part of the policymaking cycle, analysts have found 
it challenging to pin down theoretically and empirically the impact of 
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their presence more generally, and their decisions more specifically, on 
policy outcomes.
traditional “top-down” impact studies are limited in their conceptu-
alization of the consequences of judicial decisions and assessment of liti-
gation and policy reform efforts as constituting a “success” or “failure.” 
first, most try to draw a linear, causal connection between a decision 
and its aftermath. as mccann put it, this approach is like a bowling 
ball rolling down an alley: the greater the number of “pins” that fall 
following a decision, the greater the impact. if few or none fall, then 
the “bowl” is judged less effective.27 often, the “impact” bar is set quite 
high – for example, rosenberg’s well-known analysis of us civil rights 
litigation anticipated that to be deemed to have had an impact, judicial 
decisions would have to have no less than “nation-wide” effects and 
produce “significant” social change.28 moreover, because of its tendency 
to equate impact with change, this approach at best discounts but often 
ignores other responses, ranging from compliance to defiance, that are 
difficult to conceptualize using the “bowling alley” analogy.29
second, most canadian research has concentrated on studying 
instances of successful litigation by groups, predominantly by analysing 
the aftermath of scc cases involving social movement organizations 
that resulted in policy change.30 cases in which groups did not pur-
sue their goals through the courts, in contrast, are much less frequently 
studied.31 third, many such studies concentrate on tracing the rever-
berations of a few “big,” atypical cases,32 thereby limiting their general-
izability. finally, a narrow definition of “success” is often attributed to 
the groups examined, leaving the varied goals that they may have had 
underexplored or ignored.33
in response, a growing interdisciplinary and international literature 
has emerged. legal mobilization scholarship understands litigation as 
only one of a number of political strategies, such as protest and lob-
bying, employed by societal actors to effect change.34 this perspective 
decentres law and the courts and places them back into the policymak-
ing cycle, challenging scholars to understand the effects of courts more 
broadly than is typical for most litigation-centric analyses. as galanter 
famously observed, courts (and the law they apply) can endow subjects 
with bargaining norms, symbols, and procedures that “radiate” out-
wards beyond litigation.
the effects of a court … cannot be equated with the dispositions in the 
cases that come before it. there are a host of other effects that flow from 
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the activity of a court. … the patterns of general effects that we attribute 
to the courts depend on the endowments that actors extract from the mes-
sages radiating from the courts.35
research has identified three main factors that structure the degree 
of mobilization: access to the courts, sufficient “resources” (broadly 
defined) for effective legal advocacy, and the availability of “legal stock” 
(existing laws conferring legal rights, legal precedent, and so forth). 
generally speaking, more closed and conservative structures deter, 
while more open and liberal structures encourage, legal mobilization.36 
While any given los tends to be relatively stable, each is “shaped by 
[group] strategies in turn.”37 thus, some scholars have studied the inter-
action between structure- and agent-level variables, ranging from group 
perceptions and internal culture to resources and inter-group dynamics. 
others have explored reasons why some groups do not resort to litiga-
tion or do so despite a seemingly unfavourable los.38
the following section highlights factors that structure legal mobi-
lization for asylum seekers and their advocates in canada. it shows 
that they managed – despite a fairly “closed” los – to forge significant 
opportunities for themselves during the harper years.
Refugees in the Courts under Harper: “Contained” Justice?
canada’s refugee policy is governed by both domestic and interna-
tional legal norms. the definition of a refugee, as established under the 
1951 geneva convention and 1967 Protocol (to which canada acceded 
in 1969), was incorporated into canadian immigration law in the early 
1970s, while the 2002 immigration and refugee Protection act (irPa) 
contains a clause that explicitly acknowledges canada’s international 
human rights commitments. irPa also grants protection to those who 
cannot return to their country of origin due to a fear of torture, explic-
itly referencing the convention against torture.39
despite this seemingly strong foundation of legal stock, international 
human rights norms are mostly irrelevant as a source of rights- claiming 
because adjudicators largely rely on domestic legal norms in their deci-
sion making. moreover, the administration of canada’s domestic legal 
norms concerning refugees is controlled almost exclusively by the irb 
(canada’s largest administrative tribunal), which makes most final 
decisions concerning refugees.40 this high level of “administrative 
insulation”41 is no accident. access to the judiciary for rejected refugee 
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claimants and their supporters is limited in multiple ways, a fact that 
illustrates how procedural norms structuring access to the courts can 
“contain” the potential for substantive rights mobilization.42
first, before the 2012 creation of the rad, it was not possible to have 
a negative decision by the irb reviewed on its merits. although the 
rad now provides this option and the success rate for rejected claim-
ants is higher than it was previously before the fc,43 research has 
already identified a number of systemic restrictive features.44 second, 
the fc can review irb decisions only from a procedural justice per-
spective. compared to a “full-fledged” appeal, judicial review limits 
court oversight to errors in law and is generally a deferential exercise 
designed to respect the special expertise of bureaucratic decision mak-
ers. moreover, claimants must obtain “leave” (i.e., permission) from the 
fc to have their case heard, something that was denied more than 80 
per cent of the time during 2003–10.45 studies also demonstrate that 
despite the high stakes involved in refugee determination (stemming 
from the well-founded fear of persecution under consideration), being 
granted leave is very much a matter of chance; it depends on the judge 
involved, the presence or absence of counsel, and access to legal aid.46
during the harper years, between 582 (2008) and 926 (2015) refu-
gee cases were granted leave before the fc each year; this constitutes 
a low of 13 and a high of 40 per cent of refugee cases granted leave 
between 2008 and 2015. the most prominent ros with a dedicated his-
tory of involvement in litigation, the ccr and carl, participated in 
thirty-two47 and seven48 cases as an intervener or public interest party, 
respectively.
third, access to the federal court of appeal (fca) is – unique to 
immigration and refugee law – restricted. it requires the same fc judge 
who ruled on a given case to certify (upon request of counsel) that it 
raises “a serious question of general importance” that necessitates reso-
lution through an appeal to the fca.49 While the fca heard an aver-
age of 562 refugee cases a year during the harper period, only about 
300 questions in total have been certified to proceed to the fca since 
the irPa came into force in 2001;50 this further underscores the limits 
placed on access to the judiciary. during the harper period, carl par-
ticipated in only one case, and the ccr in eight cases, before the fca.
two additional cases were to be heard by the fca but were with-
drawn by the new trudeau government. in each case, key rights 
restrictions implemented under harper were involved, and the con-
servatives had lost before the fc. in Y.Z. v. Canada 2015 fc 892, the fc 
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ruled unconstitutional the denial of appeal rights (to the rad) for refu-
gee claimants from dcos that had been implemented in 2012. carl 
was granted public interest standing in this case. the fc judge refused, 
however, to consider the unconstitutionality of the dco regime as a 
whole. in Canadian Doctors for Refugee Health Care v. Canada (AG) 2014 
fc 651, which we discuss in more detail shortly, an fc judge ruled the 
2012 ifhP cuts unconstitutional. 
of the cases heard by the fca, the one case supported by carl (the 
decision was released in february 2016) involved the harper policy 
of foreclosing most appeal avenues to individuals from dcos – more 
specifically, the thirty-six-month “bar” on accessing Prra. although 
the fc and fca rejected this legal challenge, litigation on this matter 
continues.51 meanwhile, in Bermudez v. Canada, the fca affirmed the 
lawfulness of a 2012 harper government policy change regarding ces-
sations, mentioned earlier. it has not been reversed to date, although 
public hearings on reforming canada’s refugee law, including cessa-
tions, were held during the summer of 2016.52
given that a leave to appeal barrier also governs access to the scc, 
it is perhaps not surprising that the court hears refugee (and immi-
gration) cases infrequently. during the harper years, the overall leave-
grant rate did not deviate much from its historical average, ranging 
from 12 per cent (or fifty-five cases) in 2006 to 8 per cent (or forty cases) 
in 2015.53 of the 569 cases heard by the scc during this entire period, 
only fourteen involved non-citizens (roughly 2.5 per cent), which is in 
line with previous years.54 the ccr, often together with other ros like 
carl, intervened in all these cases.
of the fourteen, B010 v. Canada and R. v. Appuloappa were brought 
before the courts in 2015 following legislative changes in response to 
the arrival of mostly tamil asylum seekers aboard the Ocean Lady and 
the Sun Sea in 2009 and 2010, respectively. these arrivals had led the 
harper government to toughen irPa’s human-smuggling provisions, 
chiefly by codifying the dfn category for “irregular arrivals” into law 
in 2012, as discussed previously.55 although both cases can be consid-
ered rights-defensive “wins”56 since the scc sided with the argument 
(supported by the interveners) that the legislation was overbroad, 
both cases actually turned on pre-harper, anti-smuggling, irPa provi-
sions. in fact, thus far, most of the 2012 human-smuggling amendments 
remain in place (including the controversial dfn category).
all but two of the remaining ten scc cases involved scenarios relat-
ing to non-citizens and security, broadly defined.57 none challenged 
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legislative changes originally introduced by the harper government, 
although one, the 2014 Canada v. Harkat case, upheld the harper 
government’s legislative response to the scc striking down the pre-
harper security certificate regime in the 2007 Charkaoui v. Canada 
case.58 in another case (Agraira v. Canada), involving an argument over 
the grounds on which the public safety minister could set aside deci-
sions of inadmissibility, the government (after having won before the 
fca) incorporated narrower inadmissibility grounds (which removed 
humanitarian and compassionate factors from consideration) in its 
2013 faster removal of foreign criminals act, despite the fact that it 
could have still lost the argument before the scc (which later sided 
with the government).59
finally, one last scc case is worth noting here since it illustrates 
the “dialogue” between the scc and the harper government in the 
broader arena of immigration, even though it did not involve a refu-
gee claimant.60 in R. v. Pham, the scc allowed the reduction of a 
sentence of a “foreign criminal” to two years less a day to facili-
tate access to an appeal of his removal order. that same year, the 
harper government moved the appeal “cut-off” from two years of 
imprisonment to six months as part of its faster removal of foreign 
criminals act.
in her extensive analysis of scc cases concerning non-citizens, dau-
vergne concludes that the canadian charter of rights and freedoms 
has “failed to deliver on its promises for human rights protection” for 
non-citizens (for more on the charter and non-citizens, see gaucher, 
this volume).61 earlier observers of the court’s jurisprudence in the 
mid-1990s similarly argued that rights-expansive decisions like Singh 
v. Canada were followed by a “swing” towards more rights-restrictive
ones.62 this brief analysis of the harper government’s refugee policy in 
the courts confirms this overall trend. most of the government’s rights-
restrictive policy innovations are still in place or have not been sub-
ject to extensive litigation. the so-called wins (rights restrictions struck 
down) have been few and far between.
yet despite this track record and a highly constrained los, there was 
significant mobilization inside and outside the courts on behalf of refu-
gees during the harper years. as we will now see, law “mattered”63 in 
the broader political struggle of ros as rights talk and litigation were 
employed in tandem with other strategies. We now turn to a closer 
examination of the context surrounding one such case – Canadian Doc-
tors for Refugee Health Care – to illustrate this point.
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Fighting the Restrictionist Turn inside and outside the Courts: The 
Cuts to the IFHP
With its origins at the end of the second World War, the ifhP had 
become – by the mid-1990s – “a temporary health insurance program 
available to refugees, protected persons, and refugee claimants in can-
ada[, with] coverage … similar to the level of coverage that provin-
cial and territorial governments provide[d] for people receiving social 
assistance, including coverage for prescription drugs, dental, and 
vision care.”64 in april 2012, the conservatives announced the removal 
for rejected refugee claimants and asylum seekers from dcos of all 
benefits except emergency coverage, and it cut supplemental coverage 
for all others. eventually, an estimated 86 per cent of individuals previ-
ously covered under the ifhP (including asylum seekers) would be 
denied access to preventive and even – for some – emergency care.65
in justifying its actions, the government claimed that the cuts would 
save money, prevent refugees from accessing “gold-plated” benefits 
above those available to “ordinary canadians,” protect public health 
and safety, and deter abuse by “bogus refugees.”66 although the cuts 
prompted widespread opposition on rights-based, ethical, and practi-
cal grounds, the government remained intransigent despite mounting 
evidence that its policy goals were not being met and that the health of 
some refugees and asylum seekers was being undermined.
the political environment for those opposed to the cuts was con-
strained from the outset as there were no consultations with the prov-
inces, the medical profession, social welfare organizations, or ros 
before the announcement. rick dykstra (Jason Kenney’s parliamentary 
secretary) maintained that since the policy “was part of the economic 
action plan, budget 2012, and was under budget secrecy,” stakeholders 
could not be consulted and that the government possessed sufficient 
internal medical expertise to develop an appropriate health policy for 
refugees on its own.67 a subsequent analysis, however, found that “the 
exclusion of refugee advocates and the public health sector from this 
process was both deliberate and systematic.”68 indeed, repeated efforts 
on the part of national medical stakeholders, such as the canadian 
medical association, to sit down with the government on this issue 
were rebuffed.69
this likely stemmed from the fact that the medical profession was 
unequivocal in its opposition to the cuts. apart from labelling them 
unethical, unfair, and inhumane, it anticipated that the overall costs 
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associated with refugee health would grow as preventable and treatable 
health problems persisted and worsened, putting the health of refugees 
and the broader canadian public at risk.70 the cuts were, moreover, 
held to be discriminatory in distinguishing health care access for refu-
gees by factors such as country of origin.
in response, the government portrayed the criticisms as being 
unfounded and ideological, labelling critics in the medical profession 
“left-wing militants” who were “ideologically motivated” and belonged 
to “hard-core pressure groups.”71 the government accused opponents 
of not understanding the policy,72 being unrepresentative of “the entire 
medical profession in canada,”73 and making claims that were “unsub-
stantiated” or “factually incorrect,” in which they purposefully altered 
facts.74 government representatives even attacked individual doctors 
by disclosing their donations to non-conservative political parties and 
interactions with non-conservative politicians.75
the constrained political environment also arose with the govern-
ment’s reluctance to engage with criticism on a factual basis, frequently 
responding instead with its negative discourse concerning refugees. 
for example, when questioned in the house of commons about the 
possible “cost in long-term health care expenditure,” Kenney replied, “i 
will say what is unfair and unethical: a health program that gave better 
benefits to smuggled false asylum claimants than to canadian seniors 
who have been paying their taxes their whole lives.”76 the juxtaposi-
tion of “bogus” refugees with “hard-working, taxpaying canadian citi-
zens” was repeatedly offered by conservatives in support of the cuts.77 
When challenged to listen to the concerns of medical professionals, the 
government often responded that it chose instead to listen to average 
canadians. When opposition mPs persisted, then immigration minis-
ter chris alexander (who succeeded Kenney in 2013) accused critics of 
proposing “that anyone who comes to canada – and 10 million people 
come a year – should receive provincial health care.”78 as evidence of 
the policy’s negative effects on refugees and asylum seekers mounted, 
alexander alleged that opponents were enacting a “vindictive cam-
paign against honesty.”79
this combative approach continued in the standing committee on 
citizenship and immigration. When liberal mP Kevin lamoureux 
introduced a motion on 26 september 2012 to study the effects of the 
cuts on refugees and asylum seekers, it was voted down by a united 
bloc of six conservative mPs. When lamoureux invited a witness to 
address the cuts, government mPs introduced obstructive points of 
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order, a tactic used again when opposition committee members ques-
tioned Kenney on the ifhP. ultimately, the ifhP cuts received no sus-
tained scrutiny by the standing committee, and no critic was invited to 
discuss them. as a result, this traditional avenue of state-societal inter-
action and debate was essentially foreclosed.80
the constrained political environment also arose in the government’s 
decision to sideline evidence-based policymaking. the ifhP decision – 
which sheridan and shankardass label a social policy failure – was taken 
despite “a lack of an evidentiary basis for major government claims in 
defense of the” decision and in the face of contrary evidence generated 
and shared internally.81 When the government received internal advice 
that challenged its claims, such voices were marginalized.82
for their part, opponents pursued various political strategies before 
and after turning to the courts. notably, there was a significant mobi-
lization and expansion of societal actors. apart from traditional voices 
such as ros, human rights organizations, and religious leaders, a wide 
range of medical professionals and professional associations began to 
address this issue. indeed, more than twenty national and provincial 
medical associations became directly engaged in opposing the gov-
ernment’s policy,83 joined by numerous hospitals, medical centres, 
clinics, and social welfare organizations, among others. alongside 
collecting signatures on petitions, writing to and meeting with mPs 
and the media, using the internet and social media to raise awareness, 
occupying conservative mPs’ offices, and interrupting government 
photo ops, opponents instituted a national day of action for refugee 
health, held in June each year from 2012 to 2015 in some twenty cities 
across canada. medical professionals also created networks through 
which to mobilize and share information, both within the profession 
and with ros.84
in response to the cuts, medical professionals collected and analysed 
data from front-line health workers and institutions, publishing and 
releasing results to the broader public. for example, a 2013 Wellesley 
institute study documented how “the new system creates confusion, 
lessens access to health care services among vulnerable populations, 
leads to inconsistency in care across canada, and results in poorer health 
and avoidable illness for refugees and refugee claimants.”85 other stud-
ies highlighted the negative effects on refugee children86 and reported 
the decreased willingness of many practices and clinics to administer 
to those covered under the new ifhP rules given the confusion and 
uncertainty surrounding coverage.87 although the cuts had negatively 
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affected “a very significant number of people in very dramatic fash-
ion,” carl President lorne Waldman observed, it was “quite clear 
that the government [was] not willing to change its mind.”88
in the context of the rights-restrictive nature of the cuts, and the 
tightly constrained political environment, three individuals who had 
been denied medical assistance under the new ifhP rules, alongside 
cdrc and carl, argued in their fc submissions in late february 2013 
that the policy violated the rights of refugees under the charter.89 in 
particular, they claimed that the cuts:90
• threatened	the	rights	to	life	and	security	of	the	person	in	section	7	of
the charter;
• amounted	to	cruel	and	unusual	treatment,	contrary	to	section	12	of
the charter;
• discriminated	against	refugees	from	certain	countries,	and	discrimi-
nated against people based on their immigration status, contrary to
section 15 of the charter; and
• were	inconsistent	with	Canada’s	international	law	obligations.
arguments were heard in december 2013 and January 2014, and the 
honourable madam Justice anne l. mactavish handed down her rul-
ing on 4 July 2014.
although the section 7 argument was denied, mactavish accepted 
the section 12 challenge, finding that the government had “intention-
ally set out to make the lives of these disadvantaged individuals even 
more difficult than they already are in an effort to force those who have 
sought the protection of this country to leave canada more quickly, 
and to deter others from coming here.”91 she emphasized that the cuts 
“potentially jeopardize the health, the safety and indeed the very lives, 
of … innocent and vulnerable children in a manner that shocks the con-
science and outrages our standards of decency.”92 moreover, she “found 
as a fact that the 2012 changes to the ifhP are causing illness, disability, 
and death.”93 as for section 15, mactavish ruled that the restraints on 
dco claimants put “their lives at risk and perpetuates the stereotypical 
view that they are cheats and queue-jumpers, that their refugee claims 
are ‘bogus,’ and that they have come to canada to abuse the generosity 
of canadians.”94 for these and other reasons, she concluded that “the 
profoundly deleterious effects of the 2012 changes to the ifhP greatly 
outweigh the salutary goals of the governor in council in making these 
changes [, especially as] it has not been established that the changes 
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will in fact contribute in a material way to the realization of any of 
these goals.”95
although the harper government immediately appealed the case to 
the fca and only reluctantly moved to reverse the cuts after losing 
a stay on the fc decision in advance of the appeal, quite soon after 
the 2016 election, the trudeau government signalled its intention not 
to pursue the appeal. by 1 april 2016, coverage was reinstated, with an 
anticipated expansion of the program one year later.
Conclusions
the ifhP case provides an opportunity to explore the intersection of 
refugee policy and the courts in canada at close hand. first, and in 
keeping with one of the two framing objectives of this chapter, it helps 
to clarify the harper government’s contentious relationship with the 
courts during its years in office. as we have seen, the conservatives 
worked to weaken the rights-based foundations of canadian inland 
refugee policy, which had supported the rsd regime since the 1980s. 
moreover, they constrained the traditional political environment, shut-
ting out alternative points of view and marginalizing evidence-based 
policymaking. their actions thus strongly encouraged opponents to 
seek rights-based and judicial avenues of influence. in short, the gov-
ernment adopted an approach that increased the chances of its policies 
being challenged and even overturned through judicial venues, even 
as it sought to undermine the legitimacy of such judicial intervention 
through its political discourse (particularly evidenced by Kenney’s 
public criticisms of the courts, noted at the outset).
second, the ifhP case assists in demystifying the role of the courts 
in shaping refugee policy in canada. at first glance, the success of this 
case (alongside other cases, such as Y.Z.) seems to confirm the rights-
expansionist effects of the courts in this policy area, a claim that is com-
monly made in the literature on both canadian refugee policy and the 
charter. however, a major contribution of this chapter lies in situating 
such cases within the broader contexts of (a) the constrained los that 
defines canadian inland refugee policy generally and (b) the especially 
constrained political environment that existed during the harper years. 
only when this is done can the political import of these examples be 
evaluated and understood more fully. in the ifhP case, the potential 
for a court ruling that would go against the government was increased 
by the rights-restrictive nature of the changes and the inadequate 
the harper government’s refugee Policy 
evidentiary basis offered to support them as well as the effective legal 
mobilization fostered by the government’s actions and discourse. addi-
tional contextual factors – such as the newly elected trudeau govern-
ment’s decision not to pursue the fca appeal and the willingness of 
the judge who heard the case to accept many of the rights-based argu-
ments made by the litigants – were also critical to the eventual policy 
outcome.
finally, the significant growth of legal mobilization in the refugee-
advocacy community during the harper years – especially with respect 
to legal stock and “resources,” broadly understood – merits further 
exploration. for instance, can these advocates transform the remain-
ing structural constraints that limit their access to the courts under 
the trudeau government? What are the costs of directing so much of 
their efforts to litigation? to what extent will the existence of the rad 
change the “contained” role of the courts in this policy area? overall, 
more holistic research on the impact of the courts (which transcends 
the traditional litigation-centric analysis) is needed to understand bet-
ter the effects of courts in shaping public policy.
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